1986

Bharatiya Janata Parishad

2010-10-14T18:19:00.001-07:00

The BJP is a now-minority political party in India that, through the past half century of identity-shaping political time, has had political majority. The BJP is a fundamentalist, Hindu party known for its militant methods of making and enforcing policy in the world’s largest democracy. Although its leaders vehemently deny the charges, the party has been plagued with accusations of promoting extra-religious violence (even murder) and other influential tactics. To many, the influence and activities of this political party seem a domestic issue, I will argue that the BJP is international in origin, influence, and communication.

As Dr. Welland mentioned in class today, prior to Western colonization of the Indo-Pakistani subcontinent the linguistically-, ethnically-, religiously-, and culturally-diverse communities existed in a composite way in South Asia. However, as the British demanded that Hindu-Muslims or Muslim-Sikhs identify as one or the other for census purposes, each group constructed its own discrete identity. As the Hindu identity developed, it was difficult to discern who and what was distinctly ‘Hindu’. Politics, if they had not been involved already, became visibly powerful in the effort to build the national identity of ‘Hindustan’. The Rashtriya Swaymsevak Sangh (RSS) and BJP shared efforts to centralize and motivate the Hindu Indian public—thus, centralizing and communicating the new state identity for and to its citizens. Robust participation in shakha activities, gender- and sexuality-laden motivational speeches, and crystallizing political imagery suggested a glorious rise to new levels of masculinity.

As Appadurai outlines: “Ideoscapes are … concatenations of images, but they are often directly political and frequently have to do with the ideologies of states and the counterideologies of movements explicitly oriented to capturing state power or a piece of it.” In my diagram above, I illustrate in simple terms the main circulations of the Hindu ideoscape. This salient Hindu identity is catalyzed by British rule, speaks to offending colonizers (Pakistan, United States) and to those the BJP seeks to intimidate (Pakistan, Sri Lanka). Though the BJP no longer holds a formal majority in government, its influence lives. Recent court cases and aggressive grassroots blogging continue to communicate the BJP-constructed Hindu identity domestically and to all those who observe the rapid rise of this new world superpower. How might media images of orange-wearing, flag-toting BJP party members change or reinforce the notion of the ungovernable, uncivilized Indian to Westerners? Are party-members’ performances of masculinity informed by Western religious fundamentalist movements? Was the Hindutva movement catalyzed by British colonization and does it continue to be a reaction to colonial events?

Methods that will push me outside my traditional political science background might include a variety of tactics. A useful, and timely example might be feminist analysis of the recent Ayodhya legal decision. As many in opposition to the ruling might suggest, has the majority Congress coalition government come to this decision as a concession to the BJP? How does this decidedly anti-Pakistan decision effect the communication of the Hindu identity to Pakistan? Naturally, many news articles are available by local and international sources on topics related to BJP activities. How do the actions of the BJP communicate India’s identity to the international community? How might this identity seem salient or diffuse; might the perception be different in the global North or South? Political speeches given by BJP leaders, male and female, are notoriously metaphor-laden and energetic, filled with nuanced political signals. By analysing a key selection of political speeches given by party members and leaders I might ask: What signals is the speaker trying to send and to whom? How will these signals be understood or misinterpreted by the recipient? Is the speaker conjuring metaphorical images meant to inspire fear in the minds of Sri Lankans, advertise his virulent masculinity to Pakistani government officials, or ensure the American public that conservative democracy is alive and well?

Maha Bharat takes Ayodhya in recent ruling

2010-10-07T17:58:00.001-07:00

South Asian identities are as complex as they are varied. Mohanty concisely problematizes this issue: “Since settled notions of territory, community, geography, and history don’t work for us [South Asians], what does it mean to be “South Asian” in the United States? Regional geography (South Asia) appear[s] less relevant as a mark of identification than citizenship in a postcolonial independent nation on the cusp of economic and political autonomy.” (Mohanty 127) As Mohanty alludes to in her summary of the South Asian identity, intricate domestic identity wars are raging on the sub-continent she has difficulty calling home.

Consider the recent rulings, meant to put a stake in the 1992 Ayodhya riots, religiopolitical violence, and ultimate burning of a religious structure. Ayodhya has been a topic of extensive study in the South Asian studies, political science, and religion fields for its intense demonstration of a variety of global themes exhibited particularly acutely in the composite culture environs of South Asia. It also remains highly contested in the public religiopolitical discourse.

The origins of the burning of the Babri Masjid-Ramjanma bhoomi are nebulous but appear to have colonial-era roots. The British-imposed advent of an Indian state necessitated the division of previously-harmonious religious groups into groups possessing distinct identities. A few obvious ways to create such a recognizable identity difference is to create different linguistic, political, and religious groups. Where the traditions of sub-continental religions once overlapped, sharing customs and narratives, they began to artificially diverge. This divergence created the concept of the fearsome ‘other’—the not-Hindu to the devout Ram-worshipping Hindi speaker, the not-Muslim to the hijab-donning Urdu speaker. Both major religiopolitical communities, Hindu and Muslim, on the sub-continent began to yearn for their own (constructed) former glory days and sought to install themselves as the sole power in increasingly relevant and powerful state institutions. In a state system, land and material assets matter.

Although both sides, Hindu and Muslim, had their own unique sets of party politics at play I’ll focus on the Hindu side in this post. Given the dizzying and agitated milieu, it is no surprise that the Ayodhya events escalated in the way they did. With the added effects of fundamentalist party politics (BJP, RSS) focused on crystallizing the often diffuse and feminized Hindu voice behind a common, identifiable goal coupled with polarizing gender wars that at this time pushing young Hindu men to ‘man up’ against their ‘more virile’ Muslim opponents, a mob mentality took over at the site of the Babri Masjid. At the moment of the riots and burning of the mosque, the majority Hindus reclaimed a piece of their religious heritage—one more point for the Hindu majority in the sub-continent identity superiority race.

For the past eighteen years the Ayodhya incident has been subject to constant and passionate debate, domestically and among Nris. Although the BJP has fallen out of power and the Congress Party has taken seat in Delhi, the recent Ayodhya court ruling coming down in favor of the Hindus (siding neatly with the BJP’s nationalist fundamentalist agenda). This ruling has sparked a volley of blog posts, news articles, and, most interesting, comments on both. BJP party leaders are, predictably smug. Uttar Pradesh state leaders try to remain impartial, unaffected by the ruling, in order to maintain peace in their province. Those who stand to be most disappointed with the ruling (Islamic leaders, liberal politicians) appear to point to democratic systems for legal resolution in the form of an appeal. However, the lively civil society on the sub-continent sings an entirely different tune in the comments of each journal piece and blog post on the topic. Rather pacifist, modern voices are taken to task by irate Muslims calling for reprisal violence, claiming that the BJP is in bed with the Congress government. More than one commenter called to question the strength of India’s democratic systems. One commenter even remarked that this ruling was strategically timed by Indian politicians to distract international focus from the Commonwealth Games and related bad press for India, another suggests humanitarian use for the disputed tract of land that now lays fallow.

Is this narrative important to feminist discourse in South Asia or is it one the likes of Mohanty would rather discard as outplayed and overly focused on the masculine? What does this ruling, and local reactions to the ruling, tell the foreign observer about the nature of South Asian identities, feminisms, and masculinities? How might this ruling positively or negatively color the outsider’s view of the state of India?

The othering of Eastern Europe

2009-03-19T17:00:00.000-07:00

Despite its avidly pronounced conquest for social equality and its seemingly liberal acceptance of diversity, Western Europe is reluctant to accept Eastern European states as possessing legitimate political power. Complicating the possibility of a central discourse is the current economic crisis and the disproportionately heavy tool it is taking on delicate Eastern states. Wolff eloquently demonstrates the history of the East/West division of Europe, but I seek a current perspective. Through analysis of first-hand accounts, recent media trends, and academic writings I have detected a number of common stereotypes about Eastern Europe. Western European biases against Eastern Europe set a negative tone for discourse between the states, unfairly positioning Western states as the dominant leader and Eastern states as the perpetually backward follower.

Framing the discourse

The idealized Western European superior is nothing new. According to Kovacs “EU discourse creates and maintains a dynamic similar to the perception of the colonized by the colonizers. Colonial powers described and spoke for the colonies and their people: natives did not need to produce narratives about themselves and their countries because they were created by the colonizers." (Kovacs 197) Similarly, Makau Mutua’s savages-victims-saviors (SVS) framework outlines the basic class struggle between East and West. By branding victims and savages as such, we exclude them from the discourse as merely pawns and we further exoticise their maladies in order to brand them as the distant other, their offenses unrelated to those in the West. As we demonize Eastern governance systems, we fall into the same Western-Eurocentric cycles that have spun around for centuries. "Once again, the allegedly superior Europeans and North Americans descend on supposedly backward natives with the human rights mission to free them from despotic governments and benighted cultures" (Mutua 16) As they emerge from Communism as new democracies, Eastern European states would benefit from the support of the internationally-recognized states of Western Europe. Without the ability to define themselves, Eastern European states are mired in circular discourse trying to negate Western opinion of a ‘weak’ Eastern Europe and to establish their own identity in the political dialogue as well as their own legitimacy as democracies. The imperialism of many current human rights crusades, including the EU’s efforts to institute social development norms, pits victim against savage, positioning the Western, democratic intervener as the savior. "The early idealization of the noble savage soon gave way to a feeling of superiority. Natives were assigned a lower stage in the great chain of being and were quickly stigmatized as barbarians who had to be dominated and educated." (Todorova 123) This dynamic poises secure democracies in the West to attack the other’s culture. (Mutua 3) Based on this hierarchical West-over-East discourse, Western Europe assaults Eastern Europe through the media and, subsequently, public opinion.

Kovacs astutely compares Western European attitudes toward their Eastern neighbors to colonialist and Orientalist approaches observing "Orientalist knowledge does not aim at understanding the other on the other's terms or treating the other as an equal." (Kovacs 204) Rather than treating Eastern Europe states as partners in the EU, Western Europe uses a variety of images and stereotypes to other Eastern states, creating a distinct difference between East and West identities. By analyzing discursive strategies in 1998 and 1999 EU follow up reports, Kovacs identified perceptions of Eastern European otherness. By speaking at and not with Eastern European candidate states in these reports, the EU, and its Western leaders, allows elements of exoticism and perceptions of backwardness to color decisions about accession. The ‘native’ Easterner is therefore not as advanced socially or politically capable of defining herself on an international political stage. The challenges faced by Eastern European minority groups is even used as grounds to delay admission of the state containing that minority to the EU. “Normative claims about ethnic minorities (the Roma), true or not, provide the EU with sufficient reason to delay the accession of states on socio-cultural grounds. Compare favorable 'can-do' language about current Eastern memberstates with that of then-candidate states.” (Kovacs 208) By essentializing Eastern European states, Western European leaders of the EU are able to disregard and dominate Eastern states. Resulting from these stereotypes is "…a radically different region, where political entities are referred to by strange words, where commendable norms of transparency do not apply, given indigenous corruption unrelated to the EU or its citizens." (Kovacs 206) Thus the other is created.

Communication analysis

One might expect conservative, nationalist papers to propagate the notion of Eastern European backwardness, but would likely not expect it from liberal outlets. However, by analyzing articles in the left-leaning Guardian, a newssource I hypothesized to be more accepting of Eastern expansion, I have found enough anti-Eastern European bias to declare the sentiment a pervasive trend. Consider a few recent titles: “The response to Georgia crisis reminded Baltic States how vulnerable they are”, “Eastern Europe needs EU help in order to survive”, “United they fall: post-communist states pull EU into the red”. These titles demonstrate the perceived identity divisions between East and West, paint Eastern states as chaotic bastions of poverty, and position Western European states as the formidable savior to the ailing east.

Titles used in content analysis

Summit fails to heal EU division over recession

The Czech Republic will focus on EU solidarity

A test of solidarity

The east freezes when the west catches cold

United they fall: post-communist states pull EU into the red

Eastern Europe needs EU help in order to survive

The EU is fiddling while Eastern Europe burns

Eastern Europe braced for a violent 'spring of discontent'

Eastern Europe dismayed at Chirac snub

Anger at Rumsfeld attack on 'old Europe'

The response to Georgia crisis reminded Baltic states how vulnerable they are

Often influenced by mainstream media, the biases held by the Western European masses reflect the biases of the media, as demonstrated in my analysis of the Guardian. Popular opinion in Western Europe sees Eastern Europe as socially and politically backward. First an excerpt from an exchange with Tom Kanyok, sometime European resident: "The bias right now between Eastern and Western European EU countries revolves around the worldwide recession and whether the West should bail out the relatively poorer East. Other issues include: eligibility and adoption of the Euro by the Eastern EU countries, free immigration and labor markets East to West. “(Kanyok) All legitimate concerns, Kanyok clearly lays out the probable roots of current West-East political tension. However, many Europeans are not so coldly logical. According to Wolfgang Toegel, a German citizen: "Russia's nearest neighbours are not really independent. EU-neighbours (reference to Eastern European states) are different, after they have joined the EU, but they get a lot of money, so everybody thinks they just joined because of that reason. So lots of people think they are exploiting Europe, they are taking what we are offering." (Toegel) Note that he refers to Eastern Europe as 'Russia's neighbors' and 'EU neighbors' leaving them outside the legitimate polity of the EU and echoing Kovacs’ supposition of the biases of Westerners. This language provides a crystalline reflection of Western European media messaging in popular thought. Rather than identifying the specific concern, economic recession, stereotypes make judgments about the people and their characteristics. "Social? The general bias is that they are coming to take our jobs. East European girls are just coming to marry. They are consuming more alcohol, unfortunately that one is true." (Toegel) The loose, lascivious, and economically-dependent Eastern European bunch is an easy target for angst over recent economic stalls and a difficult group to integrate into the homogenous EU.

Conclusions

Political maneuvering creates obstacles for Eastern European states to achieve a position of respect and political legitimacy which can hinder their actions as part of the EU or can delay entry into the EU. “A senior Czech official complained that the eight eastern countries joining the EU next year had been under intolerable pressure from Brussels and Berlin and were being bullied into toeing the Franco-German line on Iraq.” (Traynor) This demonstrates the superiority the EU feels over Eastern Europe. When EU leadership bullies the political actions of Eastern European states, it unmines the legitimacy of Eastern European decisions and, consequently, the democracy of the broader polity. By addressing these issues frankly, Eastern Europe begins to make progress on their political position. These noble efforts, however, are undermined by stereotypes, media biases, and popular opinion suggesting the illegitimacy and backwardness of Eastern states.

The economic and political development of victimized, othered Eastern Europe suffers at the hands of the imperialist West. However, no victim’s hands are entirely clean in the political discourse and the savior is never completely without justification. (Mutua) In order to end this negative political discourse and shift public opinion, Eastern European states must continue to develop despite dire economic forecasts and Western Europe must look past antiquated stereotypes positioning themselves as the hegemonic leader. By using the economic downturn as an opportunity, rather than leaning on the EU as a crutch, Eastern states can prove solidarity with the development goals of the EU more broadly.

Burke, Jason. "Eastern Europe braced for a violent 'spring of discontent'." The Guardian 18 Jan 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/18/eu-riots-vilinius>.

Editorial, "A test of solidarity." The Guardian 24 Feb 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/24/european-union-recession>.

Elliot, Larry. "The east freezes when the west catches cold." The Guardian 02 Mar 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/mar/02/eastern-europe-1997-asian-crisis>.

Gow, David. "United they fall: post-communist states pull EU into the red." The Guardian 21 Feb 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2009/feb/21/global-recession-eastern-europe>.

Hooper, John. "Anger at Rumsfeld attack on 'old Europe'." The Guardian 24 Jan 2003 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/jan/24/germany.france>.

Kanyok, Tom. E-mail to author.19 Mar 2009.

Kovacs, Melinda. "Putting down and putting off: the EU's discursive strategies in the 1998 and 1999 follow up Reports." Central European Review 2001 194-234. 05 Mar 2009 <http://www.rci.rutgers.edu/~eu/Empire.pdf>.

Mutua, Makau, "Savages, Victims, Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights." Harvard International Law Review 42(2001): 201-245.

Rudd, Roland. "Eastern Europe needs EU help." The Guardian 02 Mar 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/02/eu-credit-crunch>.

Tisdall, Simon. "Fiddling while eastern Europe burns." The Guardian 24 Feb 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/feb/24/eu-globalrecession>.

Tisdall, Simon. "Mixed messages leave eastern Europe on edge." The Guardian 28 Oct 2008 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/28/nato-georgia>.

Todorova, Maria. Imagining the Balkans. Oxford University Press, 1997.

Toegel, Wolfgang. "A short summary." E-mail to author.19 Mar 2009.

Traynor, Ian. "Eastern Europe dismayed at Chirac snub." The Guardian 19 Feb 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/19/iraq.france>.

Traynor, Ian. "Summit fails to heal EU's divisions over recession." The Guardian 02 Mar 2009 03 Mar 2009 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/mar/02/eu-recession-summit>.

Elements of democracy: civil society in Montenegro

2009-02-13T15:04:00.001-08:00

Though Montenegrins are constitutionally guaranteed the right to petition their government, that right is being eroded by current legal action against Veselin Bajceta. Bajceta, leader of Montenegrin transparency organization MANS (Mreza za Afirmaciju NVO sektora) was arrested while trying to ensure public access to information about an important national economic situation. KAP, a large natural resource processor, uses up the majority of Montenegrin energy imports. Despite steep tax increases on energy, KAP is exempted. MANS coordinates efforts to petition for the responsible and open privatization of KAP. To ensure a smooth and legitimate transition, Montenegrins organized a petition effort to oppose uneven application of energy taxes. While petitioning, unmarked police forces began removing the petitioners' equipment and Bajceta resisted their action. Bajceta was arrested and charged with interfering with police action.

As Montenegro vies for their position as a legitimate democracy, even small threats to a vibrant civil society are harmful. MANS and other transparency organizations must flourish for Montenegro to earn the respect of Western European states which, ultimately, will allow or prevent the small, Eastern European state entrée to the European Union. Western European states, however unjustified they might be, point at 'backwardness' as a reason for preventing Eastern European and Balkan states accession to the EU. This ugly brand ‘others’ states that would greatly benefit from inclusion in the centrist, democratic discourse membership in the EU promotes. By perpetuating practices of ‘othering’, the EU does not strengthen its ranks rather it drives apart member and non-member states that are inextricably and geopolitically linked. By freeing Bajceta and encouraging rather than punishing civil society, Montenegro can recover from this image-marring, anti-democracy misstep. If the current devolution of democratic legitimacy continues, Montenegro will quickly fall off the EU’s list of favored candidate states.

" Civil Society engagement punished in Montenegro." Transparency International 05 Feb 2009 11 Feb 2009 <http://www.transparency.org/news_room/latest_news/press_releases/2009/2009_02_05_montenegro_civ_soc_punished>.

Eastern expansion of the European Union: achieving unity through homogeny

2009-02-06T16:51:00.000-08:00

The EU is a great success story. After the World Wars, memberstates have achieved great stability and prosperity through the central polity structure. As the EU expands its membership, it seeks to continue this unification. However, its expansion to include diverse Eastern European states poses a provocative question: Does unity necessitate homogeny? Decades of poorly-conceived social, governmental, and economic reforms have left their mark on the Eastern European public's confidence that they can catch up with Western European development and standard of living. Homogenizing forces of the EU's expansion pose significant changes to existing structure and opposition to Eastern European states' developing economic, social, and governmental identities.

The transition of many Eastern European states from communism to democracy poses a plethora of challenges. After communism, the EU has achieved great institutional transformation. Though the transition to democracy occurred more than a decade ago, remnants of the former Soviet Union still feel the effects today and simultaneously cope with the added stress of the organizational change brought on my accession to the EU. At times, accession to the EU is equated to complete rebuilding of the state. “It is not a great exaggeration to say that on accession, the new members will be re-created as states, committed to processes of policy making and policy outcomes that in many instances bear little or no relation to their domestic policy-making processes and prior policy decisions but reflect, instead, the politics, policy-making processes, and policy choices of the EU and its earlier member states.” (Cameron 25) Motivating Eastern European states to join is the EU’s ability to solidify the liberal, democratic values of these newly-independent states. (Dimitrova 3) Adding to the woes of new democratic systems is falling citizen participation. (Cirtautas) Should this already-low participation continue its decline, accountability systems will collapse and threaten the legitimacy of democratic governance in that state. The challenge posed by governance overhauls will clearly benefit all memberstates but, as the transition continues, burdens the new Eastern European members.

Despite a disabling past of failed reform, Eastern European states see accession as an excellent opportunity to bolster their economies with the support of other EU memberstates. The current EU structure allows for great economic equalization, a boon to developing economies such as those in Eastern Europe. In recent years, optimism about and confidence in the ability to develop led to widespread economic success in these states. "In the past decade, growth in most of the Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) has been clearly above the average of emerging market countries; in fact, the three Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) have been in the top five emerging market performers." (Schadler 10) However, since the publication of Schadler's piece the global economy has taken an unprecedented downward turn. Now, with the added stress of global economic collapse, new EU memberstates will be overshadowed by Western European states' relative economic stability—and by their own former promise.

With the aging European population soon to require a more productive labor force, the addition of more Eastern European citizens of working age seems promising. With the bounding economies of recent years, Eastern European economies promise to make up for this labor gap. However, as Kok points out with regard to Eastern expansion, "The EU population has increased by 20 % while the addition to European GDP is only 5 %, resulting in a drop of output per head of 12.5 % in the EU-25." (Kok 14) This trend, coupled with quality-of-life advancements that allow the EU population to age, threatens to disable Eastern European economies thereby impeding economies EU-wide. The logical solution would be to create more jobs for its proportionally economically unproductive Eastern European citizens. Again, contrary to what is necessary for Eastern European economic growth the employment rates are contracting in the developing states. “Massive labor shedding occurred alongside relatively rapid output growth. Employment rates dropped from among the highest in emerging market countries at the end of central planning to well below average.” (Schadler 11)

As with many other ethnically- and culturally-diverse regions, the EU has identity issues. “It is evident that European identity can hardly remain the exclusive commodity of an organised group of the powerful and the rich.” (Zielonka Mair 3) Although the EU was already somewhat diverse prior to its 21 Century Eastern expansion, the differences between Eastern and Western Europe now threaten to divide the polity. Previously uneven cultural induction processes persist as the EU expands eastward and each individual state seeks to assert its unique identity. (Kok 5) "Another reason for attacking diversity emerges from the positivist predilection for social and institutional engineering that is widespread among both social democratic and Christian democratic political parties. The Union is seen as a means of controlling the very complex and diversified European environment through the use of communitarian solutions." (Zielonka Mair 4) The core EU states solidify these institutional diversity obstacles. This European brand of the 'othering' phenomenon, in attempts to avoid a return to the extreme regional instability of the early 20th Century, threatens to subvert the unification of the new EU. Though the EU’s intention to unify is valid, even essential, the EU subtly attempts cultural homogeny and drives East and West apart. If continued, this will alienate the 'othered' Eastern European states and counteract benefits of the regional polity's unity.

European institutional practices lay at the center of issues related to enlargement. Beyond institutional exclusion leading to diversity issues, it poses serious questions about the ability of the EU to absorb more new members. With previously-stated economic and social issues contributing to the possibility of stalling economies EU-wide, expansion seems inopportune. However, states keep applying and the EU has continued to expand throughout the 21^st Century. Conditionality, a trend largely based on the Copenhagen criteria for entry, provides EU administration with a politically-justified way of rejecting and delaying the entry of potential new memberstates. “The content of the Copenhagen criteria are stricter than the requirements for applicant countries in previous enlargements” (Maniokas 20) Again, the EU might threaten its objective of maintaining regional stability by putting in place uneven obstacles to entry, thereby alienating the most unstable states in the region. an insistence on total alignment with EU norms and regulations remains the prevailing discourse in the process of enlargement, not only for tactical but also for strategic considerations. (Zielonka Mair 3) Further enlargement "will pose severe budgetary, administrative, and operational challenges for the EU." (Cameron 2) It seems the only option for the necessary expansion of the EU is for more wealthy states to join and balance out the economic needs of the less wealthy states. However, it seems highly unlikely that Norway and Switzerland will join the EU anytime soon and, even if they did, they may not be able to make up for the economic shortfalls of the new Eastern memberstates.

In order to preserve its inclusive nature and geopolitical stability, the EU must continue to expand. As it does so, it must be mindful of the burden it places on the delicate economies and developing democracies of its Eastern memberstates and applicants all while maintaining its effective state building and diplomatic functions. It must also allow diverse states to be diverse, homogeny does not equal unity.

Rescue plan: Iceland and the EU

2009-01-30T13:27:00.000-08:00

Many wonder how to handle the collapse of Iceland's economy and government. One of Europe's oldest democracies, the international community is hesitant to merely observe as it collapses and devolves into violent protest. Though only one of the two driving factors in Iceland's speedy accession plan is a devalued krona, there is rumor of Iceland only adopting the Euro and not seeking full EU membership. The second contributing factor, governmental collapse, was handled in a unique way: appointment of a center-left lesbian to the position of Prime Minister. Additionally, EU membership does not usually happen state-by-state and would likely include Croatia if it were to happen in 2011--membership which is currently not supported by a majority of the Icelandic people. By relying on its modernity, Iceland may gain entrée to a highly-exclusive polity much quicker than normal.

Though Iceland is the first state to fail as a result of the current economic upheaval, it is still seen in a more favorable light than states such as Turkey. To explain this phenomenon, the EU asserts that Iceland still has considerable assets and cites its longstanding democracy. Though Iceland, like Turkey, is intensely nationalistic it has somehow created for itself a legitimate, modern identity suitable for EU consumption. I credit this to two factors: Icelandic nationalistic sentiments linked to modernity and the pressing need to stabilize Iceland in order to maintain regional stability.

Opposite the leanings of most nationalistic movements, Iceland has collapsed into liberal, outward-looking politics. This is exhibited in its choice of an interim PM, its practical approach to currency conversion, and its established democracy. The issues that its Eastern European counterparts encounter when they attempt to join the EU (civil conflict, overly conservative policy, recent transitions to democracy) do not apply to Iceland. Additionally, with so much invested in UK holdings and considering violent riots present in Iceland as a result of the crash, it is no wonder the EU welcomes vulnerable Iceland with open arms. As we have discussed in the quarter so far, part of the EU’s purpose as a polity is to stabilize a once conflict-prone region through shared economic benefit. As its Western European relative threatens to destabilize the region’s economy, the EU is wise to beckon Iceland to join its ranks.

Mahony, Honor. "Iceland Could Join EU by 2011." Business Week 30 Jan 2009 30 Jan 2009 .

Traynor, Ian. "Iceland to be fast-tracked into the EU." The Guardian 30 Jan 2009 30 Jan 2009 .

Valenti, Jessica. "Iceland appoints new prime minister." Feministing 28 Jan 2009 28 Jan 2009 .

The Shiv Sena: masculinity and fascism

2008-12-11T22:36:00.000-08:00

“Several scholars have argued that nationalism is gendered with a strong masculine bias (Banerjee, 2000, 2003; Blom, Hall, & Hagemann, 2000; Connell, 1995; Enloe, 1990, 2000; Jayawardena, 1986; Kondo, 1990; Mayer, 2000; McClintock, 1995; McClintock, Mufti, & Shohat, 1997; Mosse, 1996; Nagel, 1998; Yuval-Davis & Anthias, 1989).” (Roy) As post-colonial India seeks its unique set of identities and copes with the backlash of ethno-political polarization, ethnocentric groups, such as the Shiv Sena, use ingenious nationalistic tools for movement building. Far from unfamiliar, the tools of fascist regimes are adopted and used often with great, but incomplete, success. As transnational discourse increases in importance so does the importance of effective templates for international diplomacy—if a state actor can proactively identify and categorize a movement it can arm itself with the tools with which to sustain peaceful and productive relations.

Far from demonizing the Shiv Sena as an extremist nationalist regime, I seek to identify elements of fascism so its participation in a central, moderated discourse is not jeopardized but rather enabling informed international interactions—mitigating the Shiv Sena’s motivation to resort to violent outbursts in order to be heard by the international community. By using Umberto Eco’s thorough framework for Ur-Fascism, I will analyze the Shiv Sena’s practices, rhetoric, and ideologies. Demonstrative of the sort of gender identity created by the Shiv Sena’s is this portion of Patwardhan’s Father, Son, and the Holy War: “The flames still burned, the cries of victims could still be heard. But louder, were the voices of men who said, "We've taught them a lesson. We are not impotent, we are not wearing saris, we are the sons of men." (Patwardhan) By means of the tools of fascism, the Shiv Sena unites, and ignites, its male followers by constructing their vigilante masculinity.

Cult of tradition

Walking through an impoverished North Indian city, a young Hindu man may try to find the answer to social ills in his community, he may seek to place the blame for economic struggles, and he may desire a sense of belonging in the nuanced and decentralized Hindu world. As he walks he might be met with images such as this, the logo of the Shiv Sena, a group promising to unite true, Hindu men under the flag of social progress.

“The rhetoric of nationalist/religious identity movements across the globe tends to focus on the recovery of lost masculinity.” (Roy) Inspiring the expression of hyper-masculine traits, the logo of the Shiv Sena serves as a harbinger of the group’s idealized vision of its followers. As is seen across India, the search for a former Golden Age of Hinduism is central to the mission of the Shiv Sena. By seeking restoration to their former days of glory, Hindu nationalists effectively ‘other’ their intra-state opposition, declaring them at once unpatriotic and dubbing them the invaders positioning Hindus to assume their rightful position of historically-validated leadership.

Rejection of modernism and fear of the ‘other’

Hinduism is, by nature, a difficult culture to centralize and organize due to its syncretistic nature. In order to motivate and organize, the Shiv Sena uses centralizing, trigger events to advertise their power and assimilate support. Based on the stated desire to expel the ‘other’, Bal Thackeray pitted his local upstart group against the invading immigrants. “Thackeray founded the Shiv Sena in 1966 as a ‘sons of the soil’ movement to fight for the rights of native Maharashtrians who, he maintained, were under threat from other ethnic migrants.” (Ramachandran)

In an epically symbolic display, Hindus and Muslims clashed in the 90s. During the Ram temple agitation in Ayodhya, the Shiv Sena propelled themselves to statewide unity using the classic tools of totalitarian movements (Swami and Katakatam). By mobilizing around the central language of Hindutva, the Shiv Sena, in partnership with the BJP, were able to organize a large and diverse group of men to propagate targeted acts of ideologically-motivated violence against the Muslim ‘other’, solidifying their shared, hyper-masculine identity. (Banerjee 108)

“Secular north Indian intellectuals—ironically accused of elitism—consider the Hindu nationalist campaign to be a product of cynical manipulation by political leaders.” (Basu) Banerjee notes the disdain members of the Hindu nationalist movement hold for limp-wristed, pacifist types within their own religious group, often criticism directed at the intellectual questioning that the Shiv Sena is loathe tolerating. Often, this questioning is avoided in order to perpetuate real and slim or imagined, polarizing divides in order to preserve their political power (India Uncut). Furthermore, this perpetuation of intra-state disdain provides the fuel for perpetual conflict.

Appeal to a frustrated middle class and disdain for ostentatious wealth and force of their enemies

As the lower class, dalits, rise into mainstream politics, more established political groups seek to delegitimize the underclass’ success. Thackeray himself does not come from a privileged background and chooses, instead, to mobilize the agitated, nervous middle class. “It is among the Mumbai working class and the slums that Thackeray has his fiercest supporters. Some of that support has been secured by playing on the alienation of the workers, the economic and cultural insecurities of Maharashtrians of being swamped by "outsiders".” (Ramachandran) Those outsiders come in forms of class, gender, and ethno-religious difference such as Muslims, women, and the dalits.

“(A) respected Mosie leader, Syed Shahabuddin, had declared, ‘While it is acceptable for a Muslim man to marry a non-Muslim, under no circumstances can a Muslim woman be permitted to marry any non-Muslim...’” (Bhosle) Valuing marriage, and the procreation that follows, Hindus envy Muslims their slightly higher birthrate. Statements such as the above demonstrate ethno-religious competition played out in the matrimonial context. Additionally, the Muslim Gulf oil wealth of recent years causes committed nationalists much chagrin. (Osella & Osella) While Muslims quickly adopt the trappings of modernity, Hindus are left stranded on their island of backward-looking nationalism.

Obsession with a plot

Again, a syncretistic culture lends itself to fascism through its intense need to centralize and craft its identity. “To people who feel deprived of a clear social identity, Ur-Fascism says that their only privilege is the most common one, to be born in the same country. This is the origin of nationalism. Besides, the only ones who can provide an identity to the nation are its enemies. Thus at the root of the Ur-Fascist psychology there is the obsession with a plot, possibly an international one. The followers must feel besieged. The easiest way to solve the plot is the appeal to xenophobia. But the plot must also come from the inside: Jews are usually the best target because they have the advantage of being at the same time inside and outside.” (Eco)

Pacifism is trafficking with the enemy

The epic and seemingly perpetual battles waged by fascist leaders would be logically followed by “…a Golden Age, which contradicts the principle of permanent war. No fascist leader has ever succeeded in solving this predicament.” (Eco) The Shiv Sena circumvents this conundrum by propagating a never-ending cycle of violent trigger events in attempts to retain power. These trigger events, such as the religiously-justified ethnic conflict against Muslims at Ayodhya, further entrench inflated group divides and ‘other’ the intra-state enemy. As one Thackeray supporter rails: “Germany's Jews...? What ELSE is required for Hindus to shake off the stupor and consider protecting our civilisation and culture? If telling it like it is makes one a Nazi, I say: Fine, better that than the spineless, deaf, dumb, numb and blind state exalted as Nehruvian Secularism. I wouldn't even spit on it.” (Bhosle) Thus progresses the devolution of fascist movements’ rejection of scholarly questioning—here, it converges with affronts on the masculinity of intellectuals in an effort to remove their patriotic credibility.

Popular elitism and selective populism

Thackeray successfully balances the masculine ego inflation of his followers with “There cannot be patricians without plebeians. In fact, the Leader, knowing that his power was not delegated to him democratically but was conquered by force, also knows that his force is based upon the weakness of the masses; they are so weak as to need and deserve a ruler.” (Eco) “Thackeray, called Tiger by Sena members, exercises complete control over the organization and Shiv Sainiks are fanatical in their devotion to him. The organization is a tightly controlled network of cells, which can be activated at his command. Thackeray has to only issue an order and his goon squads have in the past paralyzed Mumbai - India’s financial and commercial capital - by unleashing violence. Thackeray is notorious for his crude and often incendiary speeches. This is not the first time that he has engaged in Muslim-bashing. He is known for his anti-Muslim diatribes and for inciting violence against various minorities, with Muslims being his latest target.” (Ramachandran)

Though it is in his interest to have strong followers, he also must remain superior in order to achieve the proper fascist hierarchy—state to state, ethnic group to ethnic group, gender to gender, and leader to follower. “It's not my case that the country is subservient to its provinces. But without proud states, the country can't be much either. The Indian army's famed Punjab, Maratha and Garhwal regiments are acknowledged as some of the best defenders of the country; the regimental ethos is based on regional affinity, and reinforced by heredity, has been a strong motivating factor for soldiers. They voluntarily enlist because they consider defence an honourable profession. And their honour includes that of the family, community and region...” (Bhosle)

““Trouble-making Muslims should be wiped out from the country ... kick out the four crore [40 million] Bangladeshi Muslims and then the country will be secure," the Shiv Sena leader said. Urging Hindus to start calling India "Hindu rashtra" (Hindu nation), he maintained that only "our religion [Hinduism] is to be honored here" and then "we will look after other religions".” (Ramachandran) The Shiv Sena’s language of exclusion breeds followers who practice intolerance and cultivates a rather monochromatic view of the ideal composition of the state.

Cult of heroism, violent tendencies and newsspeak

To understand the evolution of Hindu nationalist movements toward a hyper masculine norm, one must acknowledge the former dominance of female fertility as a scion of power. Once South Asian men discovered the power of their ‘seed’, they began to dethrone the sacred woman from her historical post and claim it as their own (Patwardhan). In order to sustain gender domination, and indicative of their past rivalry, the Shiv Sena genders their language of political attack: “Mumbai’s mother-in-law lives in New Delhi. Every year, she gets about Rs 70,000 crore in taxes as dowry. In return, she gives us empty promises’ says Bal Thackeray” (Tehelka) Framing is powerful, for discourse leads to action.

In the case of the Shiv Sena their position of power is completely dependent on the perpetuation of conflict. “It was Thackeray who incited the December 1992-January 1993 Hindu-Muslim riots that rocked Mumbai. He wrote a series of inflammatory editorials in the Saamna (Confrontation), the Shiv Sena mouthpiece, urging Shiv Sainiks to declare war against India's Muslim minority in defense of Hinduism.” (Ramachandran) Included in those comments were ones such as these, promoting the heroic martyr as the ultimate patriot: “‘If… suicide squads are formed only then can we take on perpetrators of mindless violence’, Thackeray said in party mouthpiece Saamna” (The Times of India) Armed with guns representing phalluses and charged with a unifying quality of Hindu-branded hyper masculinity, Thackeray’s followers stormed the Ram temple. By so doing, Thackeray’s unwitting crew triggered a cascade of ethno-religious violence, furthered their masculine unity within the foreboding syncretistic Hindu culture, and created another cycle of violence from which the Shiv Sena stood to benefit in lodes of political power.

Conclusion

As the Shiv Sena built followers, the followers began to stage, for Thackeray, trigger events in order to stir conflict, ‘other’ those outside their immediate circle, brand theirs as the preeminent and historical group of leaders, and attempt to reclaim the former glory of the Golden Years. While cultivating and putting to use a clear sense of masculinity in its passionate followers, the Shiv Sena pursued the clear pattern of fascist regimes. By using the characterization of the Shiv Sena as fascist, a state actor might temper its reactions and interactions with the Shiv Sena, learning from template fascist groups. If included in centrist discourse, the Shiv Sena’s voice might fade from violent and reactionary to politicized and diplomatic.

"BAL THACKERAY: MUMBAI’S HERO NO.1," Tehelka 14 Apr 2007. 08 Dec 2008

“Thackeray for Hindu suicide squads” The Times of India 15 Oct 2002. 08 Dec 2008

Banerjee, Sikata. Make Me a Man: Masculinity, Hinduism, and Nationalism in India. State University of New York Press, 2005.

Banerjee, Sikata. Warriors in Politics: Hindu Nationalism, Violence, and the Shiv Sena in India. Boulder, CO, USA: Westview Press, 2000.

Bhosle. Varsha. "In rod we trust," Rediff 29 Jan 2008. 08 Dec 2008

d.face, Flickr. 07 Oct 2008. 05 Dec 2008 .

Eco, Umberto. Ur-Fascism. 1995.

Father, Son, and the Holy War. Dir. Anand Patwardhan. Digital. 1995.

Hansen, Thomas Blom. Recuperating Masculinity: Hindu nationalism, violence, and the exorcism of the Muslim 'other'. 1996.

Hansen, Thomas Blom. Wages of Violence: Naming and Identity in Postcolonial Bombay. Princeton University Press, 2001.

janashaktikarnataka, "Shiv Sena Supports Hindutva Terror*." [Weblog Jana Shakti] 03 Nov 2008. 09 Dec 2008 .

Osella & Osella, "Muslim Entrepreneurs between India and the Gulf." 09 Dec 2008 .

Ramachandran. Sudha. "India: The politics of passion," Asia Times 31 Oct 2002. 01 Dec 2008

Ramachandran. Sudha. "Shiv Sena activists arrested in Ayodhya," Press Trust of India 11 Oct 2003. 09 Dec 2008

Ramachandran. Sudha. "The Shiv Sena's Games," Frontline 4-11 Aug 2001. 8 Dec 2008

Roy, Abhik. "Regenerating masculinity in the construction of Hindu nationalist identity: a case study of Shiv Sena.." Communication Studies 01 Jun 2006 1 Dec 2008 .

Varma, Amit. [Weblog India Uncut] 12 Dec 2008. 08 Dec 2008 .

Humanizing human rights: a baseline for intervention as universal definition of human rights

2008-12-10T10:56:00.000-08:00

Through an intricate system of qualifiers, mutual responsibility, and lagging indicators Coady, Luban, Evans, and Sahnoun strive to explain the universe of human rights intervention. Woven into these practical actions and tools are the philosophical undertones of state sovereignty and the concept of which universal human rights states shall defend.

When states fail in their responsibility to protect their citizens, other states are compelled by a sense of duty to react on behalf of the neglected or otherwise harmed citizens. (Evans and Sahnoun 2) Though Evans and Sahnoun’s salient description aptly describes a state-sovereignty friendly system of mutual responsibility, it must be validated by a lengthy set of just war qualifiers, placed within a balanced international discourse, and defined by a universal conception of human rights before serving an international governing body.

Universal Human Rights

At the inception of the quarter, I was skeptical about my international human rights theory course. I knew it was instructed by a human rights universalist, while I consider myself to be a relativist (see my blog). My goal for the quarter was to establish my own idea of which rights should be universal, if any. Late in the quarter, I had an epiphany. After writing and giving a presentation on Responsibility to Protect, I had gleaned from the piece my definition of universal human rights. Evans and Sahnoun state, "For (military intervention) to be warranted, civilians must be faced with serious and irreparable harm in one of just two exceptional ways. The first is large-scale loss of life, actual or anticipated, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product of deliberate state action, state neglect, inability to act, or state failure. The second is large-scale ethnic cleansing, actual or anticipated, whether carried out by killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape." (Evans and Sahnoun 3) By using this definition of intervention, supplemented by non-state-based relative norms, we may begin to build international human rights in a non-imperialist and decentralized way.

Defining intervention and humanitarian intent

However, before defining just cause for military intervention one must define intervention and humanitarianism. By building upon a basic definition of universal human rights, states as actors may hold one another to the even standards when intervening. How do we understand and honor state sovereignty when intervening? Coady “define(s) intervention as the intentional act of one state or a group of states or an international agency aimed at exercising overriding authority upon what are normally the ‘internal’ policies or practices of another state or group of states.” (Coady 1) Coady goes on to clarify that the state receiving intervention must not consent to that intervention. As we discussed in the first half of the quarter, Mutua’s SVS framework is in tension with this specification as it could be seen as imperialist and not minority-friendly and should be avoided. However, this general concept allows one to build on top of the universal definition of human rights and work toward Evans and Sahnoun’s careful definition of intervention.

In recent times, the term "humanitarian aid" has become synonymous with military action. Partly due to the United Nations' uneven action in recent humanitarian crises, the perception of humanitarian efforts has been tainted. Discourse has become polarized into two camps: those advocating for intervention and those in favor of state sovereignty while excluding humanitarian or altruistic intent. (Evans and Sahnoun 1) Whether defined by conspicuous motive or favorable outcome, humanitarianism is difficult to gauge. Complicating matters, Coady states “(humanitarian) interventions are aimed at rescuing foreign people from harm that is being done” (Coady 2) This paternalistic frame for intervention will not allow a centrist international discourse or encourage developing states to take responsibility for protecting their citizens (Coady 2). It will, instead, empower more powerful, developed states to swoop in and intervene anytime they deem harm done. Coady wisely strikes down a lagging indicator of humanitarian intent but fails to construct a more acceptable tool for defining humanitarian intent. Luban, the eternal realist, rejects altruistic intent and favors national interest in its place (Luban 5). Though this one-sided definition of proper intent will not do, Coady validates the use of national interests in humanitarian intervention by stating “morality and prudent self-concern are self-supporting; indeed much ethical thought treats prudence as part of ethical morality, and doesn’t always link it to self interest. But it is possible for the individual’s interest to conflict with the group’s… It is really quite surprising that politicians and theorists operate so casually with the idea of national interest, and invest it with such normative power” (Coady 2).

Responsibility to Protect

Evans and Sahnoun's aim to reframe, thus to shift, the responsibility of human rights within a state to the state itself with outside assistance in only extreme circumstances, is noteworthy and practical. However, their most salient point is that of just cause for military intervention and the framework they go on to describe. The balance and definition of sovereignty is topic of hot debate, one of control or responsibility. Evans and Sahnoun argue that the state holds responsibility to "respect the sovereignty of other states and to respect the dignity and basic rights of all people within the state." As Evans and Sahnoun reframe human rights as the 'responsibility to protect', they keep the state sovereign by also defining sovereignty as responsibility, not total control.

When pondering the list of conditions for military intervention, one might question the current state of military action and inaction. If this were the international frame for declaring war based on humanitarian issues, would the US have invaded Sudan instead of Iraq? Would military intervention be a justifiable means to establish or expand democracy? Might other states have been justified to intervene with military force when the US failed to fulfill its obligations to those ensnared in the Katrina aftermath? If not, what does this mean of the application of military force to a hegemonic power? What mechanisms are there to prevent the unnecessary use of military action and to prompt proper response? In order to address the last question, Evans and Sahnoun lay out a list of precautionary principles on which Coady agrees (Coady 3).

In addition to just cause, intervention must have the right intention, be the last resort, have proportional means, and reasonable prospects. Evans and Sahnoun rely heavily on the UN as the governing body responsible for determining appropriate reaction to human rights offenses. In the same breath as they endorse the UN, Evans and Sahnoun voice my precise concerns about its use as a governing body: “its generally uneven performance, its unrepresentative membership, and its inherent institutional double standards with the permanent-five veto power” institutionalizing imperialism and hegemony (Evans and Sahnoun 5). Though I heartily disagree with the use of the UN specifically, I do agree that an international, representative body must take responsibility for just cause to be properly administered.

Within Evans and Sahnoun’s new frame, states have both the responsibility to protect their own citizens and the "duty to react to situations in which there is compelling need for human protection". If adopted by an international governing body, conversation would be allowed to flourish in the middle ground of mutual responsibility, not remain mired in the current, polarizing discourse.

The State and Its People

Evans and Sahnoun’s new frame places responsibility where, within the current state-centered structure, it should lie: with the state. However, the end goal should not be maintenance of the current outmoded, broken structure but a reimagining of the entire system of governance itself post-state. This is a much larger conversation than cannot be contained in this brief response, but must occur for units of action to match units of accountability (such as person to person action resulting in person to person responsibility).

Indicating this tension between statism and human rights, Luban wisely observes “within this state-centered order, human beings amount to little more than an ontological curiosity” and goes on to quote Kofi Annan as saying, “state sovereignty, in its most basic state, is being redefined by the forces of globalization and international cooperation”. Additionally, Luban indicates that a human right is “a right whose beneficiaries are all humans and whose obligors are all humans in a position to affect the right… Human rights are the demands of all of humanity on all of humanity”. This definition, conspicuously, rests on universal principals outside the limitations of the state as vehicle, arbiter, and enforcer—leaving rights up to informal person-to-person relationships. Though not as much an opponent of the state as default unit of governance, Luban allows “’romance of the people militant’ is just as dangerous as the ‘romance of the nation-state’.” (Luban 4) This clearly grounds an accountable just war protocol in international, non-state governance.

Conclusion

Framing is powerful, for discourse leads to action. By employing Evans and Sahnoun’s brilliantly centralizing frame, an international governing body may enforce a baseline of universally-acceptable human rights and local governing bodies uphold their own relative principals. Supplementing a universal enforcement body must be the mutual responsibility one human feels for another human’s well being; this globally-integrated, organic civil society will transcend the state and humanize human rights.

Coady, C.A.J. "War for humanity: a critique." 274-295.

Evans, Sahnoun. "The Responsibility to Protect." Foreign Affairs 81i6(2002): 99.

Luban, David, "Intervention and Civilization: Some Unhappy Lessons of the Kosovo War." 79-115.

Mutua, Makau, "Savages, Victims, Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights." Harvard International Law Review 42(2001): 201-245.

Responsibility to Protect: the duty to react and a framework of just cause

2008-11-19T08:00:00.000-08:00

Though brief, Responsibility to Protect covers many important issues involved in human rights implementation on the international scale. Evans/Sahnoun's aim to reframe, thus to shift, the responsibility of human rights within a state to the state itself with outside assistance in only extreme circumstances, is noteworthy and practical. However, their most salient point is that of just cause for military intervention and the framework he goes on to describe.

By astutely reframing humanitarian action as appropriate during a state's failure to protect, Evans/Sahnoun provides the opportunity for conversation to meet in the middle and end its current polarization. State sovereignty advocates will find solace in the initial responsibility of the state to care for its own people independently and those in favor of intervention will be confident in their ability to step in during instances of states' failure to take responsibility. (Evans/Sahnoun 2) The practical mechanism Evans/Sahnoun put in place to regulate their new system of inter- and intra-state responsibility is the idea of just cause, which they defines in concise terms.

Though Evans/Sahnoun qualify that “political, economic, or judicial steps” shall be taken first, they provide that, in “extreme cases”, there is just cause for war (Evans/Sahnoun 3). In the rarified case that necessitates military intervention one of two situations must be present or eminent: large-scale loss of life or ethnic cleansing. Without mincing words, Evans/Sahnoun include in the first cases of unmitigated natural disaster, state failure, and mass starvation. Included in the second condition is “killing, forced expulsion, acts of terror, or rape”. (Evans/Sahnoun 3) Interestingly not included in the realm of just cause are “racial discrimination or political oppression, the overthrow of democratically elected governments, and the rescue by a state of its own nationals on foreign territory.” (Evans/Sahnoun 3) I stand in agreement of Evans/Sahnoun’s clear definition, and the universal adoption of such a definition, but remain troubled by the provision for the eminence of loss of life or ethnic cleansing. Might this reduce the justification for war to a bad weather forecast for a developing state or be taken more seriously, such as escalation of ethnic violence?

When pondering the list of conditions for military intervention, one might question the current state of military action and inaction. If this were the international frame for declaring war based on humanitarian issues, would the US have invaded Sudan instead of Iraq? Would military intervention be a justifiable means to establish or expand democracy? Might other states have been justified to intervene with military force when the US failed to fulfill its obligations to those ensnared in the Katrina aftermath? If not, what does this mean of the application of military force to a hegemonic power? What mechanisms are there to prevent the unnecessary use of military action and to prompt proper response? In order to address the last question, Evans/Sahnoun lay out a list of precautionary principles.

In addition to just cause, intervention must have the right intention, be the last resort, have proportional means, and reasonable prospects. Evans/Sahnoun rely heavily on the UN as the governing body responsible for determining appropriate reaction to human rights offenses. In the same breath as they endorse the UN, Evans/Sahnoun voice my precise concerns about its use as a governing body: “its generally uneven performance, its unrepresentative membership, and its inherent institutional double standards with the permanent-five veto power” virtually institutionalizing imperialism and hegemony (Evans/Sahnoun 5). Though I heartily disagree with the use of the UN specifically, I do agree that an international, representative body must take responsibility for just cause to be properly administered.

Evans/Sahnoun’s new frame places responsibility where, within the current state-centered structure, it should lie: with the state. However, the end goal should not be maintenance of the current outmoded, broken structure but a reimagining of the entire system of governance itself post-state. This is a much larger conversation than cannot be contained in this brief response, but must occur for units of action to match units of accountability (vis a vis person to person action resulting in person to person responsibility). Within Evans/Sahnoun’s new frame, states have both the responsibility to protect their own citizens and the "duty to react to situations in which there is compelling need for human protection". If adopted by international organizations, such as the UN, the conversation would be allowed to flourish in the middle ground of mutual responsibility, not remain mired in the current, polarizing discourse.

New colonialism: I am tired of convincing Western thinkers that class divides exist in modern institutions

2008-11-04T08:00:00.001-08:00

Although Makau Mutua and William J. Talbott both argue that moral universalism and relativism, respectively, cause harm to the human rights movement, they fail to find a middle ground. While Talbott takes a broader, and admittedly more empathetic, view of human rights, Mutua manages to recognize issues of class on a more realistic scale. In a world void of cultural power imbalances and the uneven implementation of human rights statutes, a completely black-and-white conception of human rights might thrive. However, a human rights theory dominated by Western thinkers who are unable to turn to the mirror before altering others' practices necessitates a carefully checked universal discourse allowing for variation from culture to culture.

The very idea of the universality of human rights is paternalistic, it is the new colonialism. Now that colonialism in its 17th century form has gone out of fashion, developed states (particularly Western states and current and past hegemons) have found new ways of overtaking less developed states. While, in the past, the more powerful state chose to overtake the weaker state by imposing its religion on it or enslaving its population, a new form of cultural takeover has taken root. An overarching example of universalism gone awry, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, commonly thought to be an exemplary and fair international document, weaves into its well-meaning universal conception of human rights crystalline demonstrations of paternalism, Eurocentrism, and the type of elitist thought that makes universal human rights so damaging and demonstrates the impossibility of epistemic modesty, even in an institutional setting. “There is today an orgy of celebration of this script by prominent scholars who see in it the key to the redemption of humanity.” (Mutua 10)

It is easy for us, as Western thinkers, to reflect on historical events and identify many instances of imperialism and to denounce them: the crusades, slavery in the pre-Civil War South, strip mining operations in Spanish colonial states. Talbott's out on imperialism appears to be epistemic modesty. “A moral philosophy is epistemically modest if it acknowledges its fallibility.” (Talbott 15) Though a nice nod to relativism's respect for the culture of origin, it is not sufficient to guard against Eurocentric imperialism. Talbott continues: “To avoid moral imperialism, we must acknowledge our fallibility and refrain from moral paternalism.” (Talbott 49) By simply stating that one's word is fallible, does not institute any check on that fallibility, as can be demonstrated by such oxymoronic acts as Western states instituting democracy in developing states. In order to keep us epistemically modest, we need governing bodies and institutions to air controversies and moderate discussion. These institutions do exist; however, they are in sad shape.

The primary institution through which international human rights theory is debated and shaped is the United Nations (Mutua 2). Though "the UN revitalized and confirmed European-American domination of world affairs" the existence of an international human rights institution remains a key part of the balance between absolute relativism and imperialist universalism (Mutua 14). Sadly, rather than being a balancing force, institutions like the UN have been abused by the West. "The West was able to impose its philosophy of human rights on the rest of the world because it dominated the United Nations at its inception.” (Mutua 15) However Western-dominated the UN is, the institution of formalized transnational communication on human rights is notable. Though intrinsically-flawed, the existence of some form of transnational organization, and a plurality of watchdog organizations, is key in finding the delicate balance between relativism and paternalism.

Watchdog organizations, in most political realms, provide a very plural check on the dangerously unilateral power of transnational organizations. To address these concerns, Talbott cites the importance of organizations such as the “International Criminal Court to adjudicate rights violations.” (Talbott 182) Mutua does a good job of framing the ills of such existing watchdog organizations: “Today, most of the activities of the International Court of Justice, Amnesty International, and the other Western-based INGOs, such as Human Rights Watch, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and the International Human Rights Law Group, are focused on the Third World. As a consequence, the predominant image of the savage in the human rights discourse today is that of a Third World, non-European person, cultural practice, or state.” (Mutua 16) This microscopic focus on Eastern human rights violations would be acceptable if balanced by the same focus on Western happenings. However, it is not. “Western countries, like the United States, are notorious for their violations of the civil rights of racial minorities and the poor.Although both AI and HRW have haltingly started to breach the publicity and advocacy barriers in these areas, such reports have been sparse and episodic.” (Mutua 17) If effective watchdog organizations were stimulated to more effectively balance the power of transnational organizations, the current system would more closely reflect the ideals put forth by Talbott and quell the class concerns highlighted by Mutua.

Yet another important institution, aside from the transnational institution, is that of the state and national governance systems. “The fallacy of UDHR, which refers to itself as the 'common standard for achievement for all peoples and all nations' is now underscored by the identification of human rights norms with political democracy. The principal focus of human rights law has been on those rights that strengthen, legitimize, and support the liberal democratic state to non-Western societies." (Mutua 15) The imperialism of many current human rights crusades pits victim against savage, positioning the Western, democratic intervener as the savior. This flat dynamic poises imperialist democracies to attack the other’s culture through the politically-defensible method of attacking the state surrounding the non-Western culture. (Mutua 3) Mutua clarifies: “The state should be unmasked as a mere proxy for the real savage. The culture, not the state, is the real savage.” (Mutua 20 21) Mutuas savages-victims-saviors framework outlines the basic class struggle between East and West. By branding victims and savages as such, we exclude them from the human rights discourse as merely pawns within the game of elitism and we further exoticise their maladies in order to brand them as the distant other, their Eastern offenses unrelated to those in the West. As we demonize Eastern governance systems, we fall into the same Eurocentric cycles that have spun around for centuries. "Once again, the allegedly superior Europeans and North Americans descend on supposedly backward natives in the Third World with the human rights mission to free them from despotic governments and benighted cultures" (Mutua 16) The universal imposition of democracy at the state level, disregards the very real value of tribal, indigenous, and non-state governing systems. "The globalization of human rights fits a historical pattern in which all high morality comes from the West as a civilizing agent against lower forms of civilization in the rest of the world." (Mutua 10) While I agree that despotic and theocratic governing systems are destructive and do not honor the autonomy of an individual, I do not believe that democracy is the only system through which effective governance can be achieved. Democracy is a Western institution, put forth by the modern-day crusaders of said cause without respect for the diversity of effective governance systems contained in the world. I argue for a plurality of governing systems and units of governance, beyond and within the state. Talbott asserts both autonomy and the universalism of human rights. (Talbott 124) If autonomy were truly honored, would the autonomous person feel bound to the universal imposition of human rights in the form of a democratic governance system?

Though tolerance of autonomous views is espoused throughout discourse on international human rights law, precedent-setting documents, such as the UDHR, undermine the practicality of such balanced ways of thinking. In the UDHR, its conclusion negates any good intention contained therein. "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms set forth herein." Article 30 clearly states the paternalistic nature of the UDHR by asserting its infallibility, so much for epistemic modesty. Talbott, no doubt heavily influenced by such historic documents as this, somehow fails to note the epistemic immodesty inherent in such universal agreements and does not provide a practical solution for these very real concerns.

Underlying and preceding participation in any form of formalized international human rights discourse is an education, often defined in Western terms. The 'right to education' has been used in various forms, historically, to control the minds of a population. Though Talbott (137) gives no advice on institution of such a standard, practical grounding is what ensure that this standard remain useful, culturally-appropriate, and free of the cultural colonizer's bias. In search of a universal approach to practical implementation of education, I turn once again to the UDHR. "Education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." In agreement with Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, I prescribe the institution of universal education equally available to people of all backgrounds in all states to the level each person deems appropriate. Unlike the UDHR, I do not endorse the porkbarrelled support of UN peace initiatives in Article 26. As I have previously argued, historical hegemons have overtaken the cultures of the colonized through other paternalistic means. "It (education) shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace." (UDHR) Too often framed in the narrow confines of 'human rights education', the universal right to education is turned into yet another tool of oppression. Again, Mutua’s framework makes good sense of this seemingly laudable aim.

Though the concept of universal human rights is noble and equitable in theory, as Talbott demonstrates, it blatantly ignores issues of class, as Mutua clarifies, and all too often steps into the paternalistic. Additionally, it leads to the formation of institutions that further perpetuate past patterns of Eurocentrism and cultural crusades that seek to obliterate the culture of the indigenous other and supplant it with infallible Western values, brazenly ignoring the notion of epistemic modesty. By taking into account Talbott and Mutua's significant arguments on the merits and dangers of universal human rights, I find both arguments lacking in practical solutions. The grassroots, consensus-based (but not necessarily democratic) development of a set of human rights appropriate for each unit of governance is an integral first step in the establishment of the precedent of human rights. Additionally, we must salvage our ailing transnational governing bodies by balancing and pluralizing watchdog organizations and knocking down the endemic Eurocentrism in such organizations so that all may participate outside the role of victim. “In order ultimately to prevail, the human rights movement must be moored in the cultures of all peoples.” (Mutua 8)

Mutua, Makau, "Savages, Victims, Saviors: the Metaphor of Human Rights." Harvard International Law Review 42(2001): 201-245.

United Nations. General Assembly. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 1948.

Talbott, William J. Which Rights Should Be Universal?. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Millennials and foundations: productive partnerships for social change

2008-06-12T08:00:00.000-07:00

At the genesis of organized philanthropy, foundations were built and staffed by experienced, older, white men. Throughout the past few generations' increased awareness and recognized value of gender, race, class, and religious diversity, concerted efforts have been made to add balance to the workplace. As foundations have evolved in recent times to reflect their corporate partners they have begun to realize that representation of the populations the organization seeks to serve is important in gaining ground. After all, those who live the issues know the solutions best. The readily apparent practice, and most recently legislation, on leaves one group notably absent from the discussion: young people. Some cite faulty work ethics; some believe that young workers do not have enough experience to fulfill philanthropic obligations, while others simply do not recognize young people as a minority worthy of advocacy in philanthropic organizations. Despite a lack of faith from current leadership in the sector, young people have already defied barriers and built admirable careers. Bloggers like Trista Harris, fellowship programs such as the Multicultural Fellowship Program at the San Francisco Community Foundation, and current foundation leaders who support the progress of young people such as Luz Vega-Marquis with the Marguerite Casey Foundation are all exemplars for ways that young people succeed at shaping philanthropy and are enabled to break into the foundation scene. By taking hints from the private sector and Millennials themselves, foundations are making progress in attracting and retaining next generation workers. Foundations may, with a bit of adaptation, use these strategies as templates for their own integration of Millennials into their workforce.

What these exemplars have in common is recognition of a fresh tradition emerging with the newest generation of leaders and with it a new way of working. Millennials do not lack work ethic, theirs is just a new type to include in the already wide array of generations established in the workforce. As Traditionals continue to lead and prepare for retirement, Baby Boomers stake their claim to the corner office, and Gen Xers find the independence they crave, Millennials emerge bold, ambitious, and ready to balance the load of conflicting engagements. This eagerness to achieve, however, is often misinterpreted as an unearned sense of entitlement by previous generations. Misperceptions such as this can lead to clashes and turnover in the workplace making philanthropies much less hospitable and productive across generations. To counteract talent loss and galvanize the generations, many foundations, affinity groups, and young people themselves have been busy dreaming up viable solutions. Millennials are just beginning to enter the workforce, in order to attract and retain this generation's talent philanthropic organizations must shift to accommodate diverse needs of workers, partnering with them to catalyze the next generation of social change.

Before launching into solutions, strategies, and examples, a definition of the youngest generation. Who are the Millennials—also known as Gen Y? "They’re the hottest commodity on the job market since Rosie the Riveter. They’re sociable, optimistic, talented, well-educated, collaborative, open-minded, influential, and achievement-oriented. They’ve always felt sought after, needed, indispensable. They are arriving in the workplace with higher expectations than any generation before them—and they’re so well connected that, if an employer doesn’t match those expectations, they can tell thousands of their cohorts with one click of the mouse." Unfortunately, most current foundation leaders do not see the generation that way. Instead, many Traditionals, Boomers, and Xers view Millennials as inefficient, hypersensitive, and possessing an undue sense of entitlement (Lancaster). Based on these disconnected assumptions, workplace communication mishaps ensue. The busiest generation yet, these young people, by nature, balance multiple commitments with grace. They grew up shaped by pre- and post-9/11 politics—an economic stability followed by the constant presence of terrorism in the popular media and a sinking dollar. These environs have created risk-takers with the drive to shape and lead. Molded by the do-good mentality of the Reagan Administration and the ‘have you hugged your child today?’ campaign of the Clinton Administration, this new generation grew up coddled and socially active. The most civically-engaged generation since the Traditionals, Millennials are uniquely adapted for the foundation scene. As Carmen Blakely with the US Student Association explains: “The upcoming generation is the most diverse yet” and she is right (Blakely). Millennials are the first to feel globalization throughout their formative years. On the more solid side, Millennials are the most solidly tech-savvy generation yet—using services such as YouTube, text messaging, and Microsoft Office almost by reflex. Despite what sounds like a philanthropist in the making with ability to multitask, socially-active, and comfortable with diversity, Millennials are often seen in a different light by employers. Their competitiveness and ambition is ‘breaking rank’ and not paying dues before moving up. Their collaborative nature is seen as unwillingness to follow direction. Their expectations for a respectful and collegial work environment are interpreted as a sense of entitlement without the years of experience to back it up. What this new generation demands of an employer, is a level of flexibility never before required by an upcoming generation—and the understanding to look beyond stereotypes to support them.

With a mission to support young women and transgendered youth, Third Wave Foundation reaps obvious benefits from employing and heeding the leadership of young people. At its genesis, Third Wave recognized that in order to support young people, young people must be present in the decision-making process. Setting out to eliminate sexism, racism, homophobia, and other types of injustice, Third Wave's founders noticed a gap between populations being effected by political changes and those analyzing the transformations. As they explain, "when you turned on the television, read the news, or listened to the radio, no one was talking or listening to young women. The pundits and experts were almost always white men discussing the ramifications of various legal arguments, not the reality of these issues, not the impact they would have on young women’s lives." (Third Wave Foundation) Currently, the foundation employs a staff of seven and a board of fourteen young people - all of whom have impressive resumes to back up their powerful titles. Take Alex Teixeira, a Third Wave board member: "Alex is currently the Philanthropic Partnerships Officer at the Astraea Lesbian Foundation for Justice and on the board of Resource Generation. Prior to Astraea, Alex developed strategies and tools for collaborative sexual rights advocacy within the United Nations as the research and policy coordinator for global advocacy at the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission (IGLHRC). Alex has served on the NGO Task Force of the Secretary-General’s Study on Violence Against Women, as an evaluation consultant to the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), and as a program fellow at the Global Fund for Women." With leadership by people such as Alex, it is no wonder that in its first five years of operations Third Wave gave over $350,000 to organizations tackling issues from prison reform to reproductive health. Although a fairly unique example, Third Wave's staffing decisions show that young people are, too, capable of driving change by relying on their experience in the field and dynamic networks to move large pieces of work through to fruition.

While not all organizations’ missions support a staffing structure such as Third Wave’s, there are other solutions that may work for them that help integrate Millennials into their staff. Capable, motivated potential philanthropists are often driven away by overly traditional organizations that they view as artificially blocking their development. In a focus group highlighted in “Ready To Lead” “many younger people expressed frustration over top-down decision making, overly hierarchical structures, poor communication, lack of transparency around decision making, a culture of sacrifice, and resistance to change.” These systems, while they may have worked for past generations, are deemed unacceptable by and proven ineffective for Millennial workers. Not surprisingly, potential employers find that a flexible work schedule is imperative for the next generation of recruits to continue their balancing act while working. Trista Harris, Program Officer and prolific blogger, points out, “When people are measured by what they accomplish, not how much time they are at their desks, the rules change. Suddenly the star employee isn’t the one who arrives at 6am and leaves at 6pm, it is the one who is most knowledgeable about community solutions and has the most positive effect on their program area. How different would the sector be if we were all working at full capacity and still had time to be a good parent and an engaged community member?” Some employers fund paid volunteer leave for workers who go out into the community to make a difference. Widely implemented by for-profit organizations as a benefit, foundations would be wise to implement such programs not only to increase their employee value statement but to enhance the work of the foundation by providing resources for staff to build connections with the communities they serve. “For millennials and experienced workers, skills-based volunteerism is also a way to enhance their careers.”(Needleman) Another quality that is important to Millennials is challenging work. This generation, pushed to success their entire lives, wants to put the tools they’ve developed to use. Why not recruit a talented Millennial to a foundation communications team and task her to create an advocacy campaign for a key program area? The results might surprise older generations as the young person uses online applications to make a movement viral—spreading word across the globe in just hours. Taking a hint from such habits, United Way recently launched its “Text-to-Give” initiative which donates $5 for each text message received to Hometown Huddle, an NFL-run children’s fitness program. Whether hire through conventional means or via a rich fellowship program, the next generation’s high expectations and insatiable thirst for learning and career progression pose an apt challenge to employers. An engaged, empowered, and collaborative workplace benefits not only Millennials but the philanthropies who hook them as well.

Once a foundation attracts the Millennial worker, how does it keep the worker productive and happy? By bucking traditional responsibilities and rewards, Millennials have effectively confused employers who now struggle to find ways to entertain their younger employees’ interests. According to a survey of over one thousand workers 21 to 28, “To retain your Gen Y (Millennial) workers, focus on the work environment. Workplace factors that are most important are working with a manager they respect and people they enjoy, and striking a balance between personal and work obligations.” While generations past paid their dues, slowly climbing the corporate ladder and seldom making career changes, Millennials are projected to change careers an average of nine times throughout their lives and expect to spend less than two years in entry-level positions. (Forbes) On top of personal expectations, they expect a great deal from their managers, asking of them respect and consistent mentorship to support their growth. This is a generation motivated to move and change with a non-linear concept of the workplace and career paths. “Executives who adapt their organizational cultures for less traditional hierarchy, while holding everyone accountable for meaningful mission impact, are in the best position to attract and retain the next generation of leadership.” (Ready to Lead) When leaving one job for the next, Millennials cite better pay, opportunity for advancement, and more comprehensive benefits long before they refer to such outmoded rewards as a snazzier job title. Trista goes on to propose that philanthropies would be best served by all generations if they move away from a desk time baseline for measuring an effective worker to measuring performance instead. This revolutionary concept, taking philanthropic workers away from the office and into the community, may just be the key change necessary in retaining Millennials and optimizing their productivity as it allows an extremely flexible schedule, respects the leadership capacities of all levels of an organization, and provides for concrete opportunities for workers to give back to their communities.

“What do these cohorts value? Traditionals value satisfaction. Baby Boomers value recognition. Gen Xers value freedom. Millennials value meaning. What do these generations expect? Traditionals expect people to ‘pay their dues.’ Boomers want fulfillment. Xers want a seat at the table, now. Millennials want to be heard. What does an organization’s mission have to say to each generation? Traditionals want meaning. Boomers want it clear and simple. Xers want no BS. Millennials, like Traditionals, want meaning.” With a four-generation workforce now in place, organizations are getting creative in their efforts to facilitate productive cross-generational interactions. Whether through alternative, non-hierarchical management structures or by attending conferences such as the Council on Foundations Annual Summit, with programming on next generation leaders, organizations are beginning to learn new ways to enable their workforce to interact harmoniously. Too often, young people are welcomed into an organization based on the merit of their application only to find that they are pigeonholed in the traditional position of a young employee: to learn and wait their turn to teach. However discouraging and inefficient this dynamic can be, some organizations are actively counteracting its effect. “Set up a reverse mentoring program. Companies from Procter and Gamble to Siemens have set up tutoring for middle-aged executives. Young newcomers help the executives navigate the Net. Jack Welch of General Electric fame says that ‘e-business knowledge is usually inversely proportional to age and rank.’ GE matched 1,000 managers and 1,000 young employees. Even though the younger cohort had just joined the firm, they tended to understand new technologies better than GE’s finest.” While some organizations are comfortable allowing young people to lead, others still need to learn to trust each other. In a question and answer forum on A. Fine Blog, a reader expresses her frustration with older generations’ mistrust for Millennials’ practices in the workplace and asks for viable solutions to build communication. In an astute answer, the blog administrator writes: “One thing that you can do to break down the distrust is perhaps run a seminar or two for the older staff members on social media tools; what they are and how they can be used in philanthropy and social change efforts. This would bring out your natural strengths, be informative for folks, and provide a common language for you all.” (A. Fine Blog) By helping generations understand each others’ methods of getting the job done, they can put aside their differences and focus on their shared commitment to make social change.

In order to put their socially-conscious, overachieving, collaborative work ethics to use, Millennials need training and education. To counteract the conundrum of philanthropies “in order to work you have to have experience, in order to gain experience you have to work”, there are trailblazer fellowship programs that allow young people to do both. The San Francisco Community Foundation Multicultural Fellowship Program cultivates the next generation of foundation professionals by placing them with local foundations in junior positions while they develop knowledge of the sector. As CEO, Sandra Hernández, puts it: “Our Multicultural Fellowship Program provides us with a unique opportunity to powerfully impact the future of the philanthropic, nonprofit, and public sectors. Programs like ours cultivate the next generation of passionate community leaders who not only reflect the diversity of the communities we serve, but also are fulfilling a calling to strengthen those communities. These young leaders push all of us to live up to their highest expectations, thereby keeping us at our best. They bring a wealth of new ideas, new perspectives, and cutting-edge practices from their personal and academic experiences, and from their rich community backgrounds.” After instituting a wildly successful program, the foundation put together a list of tips for other foundations as they institute similar programs in order to share their newly-acquired knowledge with the field (Appendix I). San Francisco Foundation Fellowship alums include current leaders such as Charles Fields. After completing his two-year fellowship through the San Francisco Foundation, he has progressed to a position at the Marguerite Casey Foundation and is a highly sought-after speaker on diversity in philanthropy. Luz Vega-Marquis, President and CEO of the Marguerite Casey Foundation, who hired and manages Charles at the foundation says about generational diversity: “Developing and strengthening the next generation of leaders is critical to effective philanthropy. A diverse mix of races, ages, and classes in philanthropy provides the new perspectives we need to develop new solutions to community challenges. Young activists and non-profit leaders bring valuable knowledge of the strategies being used in communities today to make change. Their experience makes them more effective grantmakers, who will lead the sector in developing the innovative methods we will need to create a more just and equitable world.” In this case, we can see the benefits of instituting foundation fellowship programs are threefold: train the next generation of professionals, supply foundations with a qualified workforce, and feed lessons across the sector.

According to Joel Fleishman in 2007's "The Foundation: Great American Secret" philanthropy as a sector has three primary roles: to drive, partner, and catalyze for social change. (Fleishman) Taking its hint from the nature of the field, Emerging Practitioners in Philanthropy (EPIP) networks constituents through a national network of eight local chapters, develops leadership skills through programs such as Philanthropology, and advocates for generational diversity, preparing the field for young people to enter. By providing broad, powerful networks for young people this connects them to the solutions and experiences other Millennials have dreamt up. Additionally, this generation of collaboration and social networking on the job, appreciate the opportunity to build bonds with other people in philanthropy. Aside from member benefits, chapter and national leaders gain valuable leadership skills as steering committee chairs and event hosts. Philanthropology, designed by EPIP to train up-and-coming grantmakers, collaborates with local philanthropic organizations to tailor a course of study to a specific group of emerging grantmakers. At the 2008 Council on Foundations Summit, EPIP sponsored a track of sessions on generational leadership in philanthropy including sessions featuring current Millennial leaders, how to cultivate new professionals, and the smashingly popular Philanthropy 2.0 reception, co-developed with the Case Foundation. By creating synergies between current events in the philanthropic world, connecting leaders and emerging practitioners, and advocating for constituents, EPIP has begun to leave its mark on philanthropy by providing new ways for young people to get engaged and develop.

Council on Foundations President and CEO Steve Gunderson writes: “We are at a unique moment in time. We are transferring the leadership of philanthropy to a new generation. Yet, we are doing so amidst the greatest pressure ever for impact, effectiveness, and good governance. We need to prepare the next generation to excel in ways we never before imagined. Diversity is essential to effective philanthropy. One of the key components is new ideas, new perspectives, and new understandings of how best to serve the evolving needs of society's many challenges. Without young activists at the table, we simply won't know how to best address today's problems in ways that creates tomorrow's solutions.” (Gunderson) Beyond the generational leaders track at this year’s Council on Foundations Summit, focus of the sessions was placed on leadership, partnership, impact, and diversity—all issues that touch the role of Millennials in philanthropies. In a session titled “Millennials and the Moment” four leaders of the next generation spoke about their diverse experiences to a crowd of eighty philanthropy professionals across all four generations. Andrew Gillum, a City Councilmember in Tallahassee, Florida, related his experiences as a twentysomething elected official searching for his network. Not finding one, Andrew started Young Elected Officials Network to serve the 4.8% of elected officials under the age of 35. So far, he has nearly 500 officials in his network and it is growing. After showcasing the work of four young leaders, the audience pelted the panel with voracious questions about their experiences. Other than talking about their specific experiences, the students made the salient point that ours is the most diverse generation in US history and that it is up to us to reverse the polarization perpetuated by past generations. (Harris) In addition to superb conference programming for and about Millennials, the Council arranged for a team of top-notch bloggers to cover happenings. Trista Harris’ blog, New Voices in Philanthropy, and EPIP’s blog, Epiphanies both provided extensive coverage of Summit proceedings—making their observations and information learned quickly viral, a key trait of Millennials and a valuable marketing tool. Aside from Summit-covering blogs, numerous other Millennials are chronicling and sharing their experiences in philanthropy on blogs such as Tactial Philanthropy and PhilanthroMedia. Even more relevant is a Case Foundation-funded blog, Social Citizens Blog—and corresponding discussion paper. This blog, like Trista’s revolutionary ideas about work environment, cleverly captures the Millennial generation. Based on a collaborative and consensus-driven model, Social Citizens (whose slogan is ‘Immerse. Converse. Disperse.’) provokes Millennials to debate current issues in social change then go out into the community and enact change. By combining Millennials’ networking, technological, civic, and leadership skills and interests, these forums successfully connect solutions of successful organizations with the input of young people themselves and share them across the sector to all who read them.

As we begin to understand the Millennial generation, and the Millennials understand Traditionals, Boomers, and Xers, possibilities for social change expand. By capitalizing on the enterprising nature of the next generation, philanthropy has already seen great gains. Continuing this generational revolution with ideas like those of Trista and the Case Foundation’s, even more advances are within grasp. By giving young people space to interact, opportunities to lead, and the flexibility to pursue their personal conquests, foundations will gain the talents of a truly diverse generation. Although exemplars presented in this paper can serve as excellent templates, each foundation must decide what diversity and the value of young people in the workplace mean to their organization.

Traditionals are not in place only to teach and Millennials not only to learn, leadership in foundations is an exchange in which each generation must work collaboratively to achieve organizational harmony. “The good news is that many of the perks Millennials seek – such as education, training and advancement opportunities – not only will help firms attract and retain these professionals right now, but also will position these workers to tackle new business challenges and help their firms grow and prosper in the future.” (Yahoo!) So, to criticism that Millennials demand too much of their employers and expect too much too soon of their positions, take note that effort invested by the sector will be returned in dedicated, high performance and substantive contributions to social change.

"Cultivating the Next Generation of Foundation Professionals. Council on Foundations Annual Summit 2008. Gaylord National Hotel and Conference Center, National Harbor, MD. 05 May 2008.

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